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STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

Case No. 950560

:

TRAVIS E. TELFORD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT LIMITED THE SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
DETECTIVE HANSEN TO MATTERS RELATING NOT ONLY TO CODEFENDANTf
BUT TO DEFENDANT AS WELL.
The State argues that the trial judge, in limiting the scope

of cross-examination of Detective Hansen on the redacted statement,
merely restricted defendant from questioning the detective as to
matters related to the codefendant. The State would therefore have
this Court believe that defendant was free to question Detective
Hansen as to all matters relevant to his direct testimony and
related to the defendant. (See State's Brief at 16, 23) This is
untrue.
Defendant was denied the opportunity to ask Detective Hansen
if the statement is a complete representation of what the defendant
had told him.

(R. at 1390 line 2 to 1397 line 25)

Defendant

should also have been allowed to ask such questions as:

Did

defendant say that he was the one who shot the victim?

Did

defendant say he willingly retrieved more bullets? Did he say that
somebody had pointed the gun at him and made him drag the body?
1

Such questions have nothing to do with the codefendant, yet are
very relevant to the defendant.

Such questions would certainly

fall within the scope of the detective's direct testimony; yet, in
an effort to protect the codefendant's constitutional rights,
questions such as these were not allowed.

This Court should bear

in mind that the redacted statement as testified to by Detective
Hansen was not a transcript of a recorded statement defendant gave;
it was merely the detective's recollection of it as he put it in
his report either the night of the conversation or the next day.
He neither recorded the conversation nor did he take notes.
also admitted that his report could contain inaccuracies.
775 line 3-16; 776 line 5-11)
discretion

in restricting

He

(T. at

The trial court abused its

the cross-examination

of Detective

Hansen.
II.

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE COULD BE FOUND IN BOTH THE UNREDACTED
STATEMENT AND IN PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE HANSEN.
The State argues that the unredacted

exculpatory in any way.
that,

even

if

the

statement was not

This essentially goes to the argument

trial

court

erred

in

restricting cross-

examination of this witness, the defendant was not prejudiced
thereby.

In other words, while there may have been an error, it

was not prejudicial.
The State has framed the issue as follows: If there had been
separate trials, is there a reasonable likelihood that defendant
would have been acquitted?
Court has stated that

(State's Brief at 2)

!l

[f]or federal

However, this

constitutional error to be

held harmless, we must "sincerely believe that it was harmless

2

beyond a reasonable doubt. f ff State v. Dahlquist, 308 Utah Adv. Rep.
35, 37 (January 24, 1997)(Emphasis original)(Citations omitted).
Therefore, as in Dahlquist, this Court should only confirm the
defendants conviction if it "can honestly say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that [defendant] would still have been convicted of murder
even if the trial court had" ordered separate trials, allowed
defendant's unredacted statement to be admitted, and allowed free
cross-examination of Detective Hansen.

Id.

This Court further stated:
It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence
to support the conviction even if [the errors had not
been committed] . It is inconsequential that a retrial
will most likely result in a conviction.
"Beyond a
reasonable doubtf requires the highest level of
certainty known to our legal system . . . .
Id.
(Citations omitted).
That!s a high burden to meet. Letf s briefly examine what we know
the jury would have heard if the statement had been unredacted:
- the victim had inquired about buying a gun from the
codefendant
- the codefendant had the gun
- the codefendant began shooting without any warning
- the codefendant did all of the shooting
- the codefendant told defendant to move the body.
(See

the

unredacted

statement,

contained

in

the

parties1

Stipulation).
We should examine the foregoing in light of other evidence
which the jury did hear:
- the codefendant received a telephone call informing him that

1

the victim was a "rat" (R. at 1660 line 14-19; 1685 line 23 to 1686
line 2)
- there was a $10,000 "hit" out on the victim and that the
victim "was trying to set up a deal with [the codefendant] to get
him busted" (R. at 1663 line 14-22; 1686 line 18 to 1687 line 5)
- it was the codefendant who shot the victim (R. at 1661 line
7-12; 1692 line 4-7; 1721 line 24)
- at the time the victim was shot, the defendant was scared
("I woke up having the nightmare about Troy's death.

How I was

sitting there discussing if he wanted to buy the gun how he would
pay for it.
wearing."

I bet I still have skid marks in my pants that I was

R. at 1764; State's Exhibit 37A)

- after he was arrested, the codefendant resided in the Weber
County jail (T. 786 line 11 to 787 line 6)
- upon arrest, defendant was taken to the same jail
- Detective Hansen testified that defendant was scared to go
to that jail, and that he suspected he knew the reason why
defendant was scared.

(R. at 1421 line 17-21) (Could it be that

defendant had at least intimated, in his April 14 statement to
Detective Hansen, that he had been forced to participate?)
the

codefendant

threatened

to kill

defendant

because

defendant "spilled his guts and told everything he knew" about the
murder (R. at 1687 line 8 to 1688 line 3)
If the jury had been given the unredacted statement, and heard
the unrestricted cross-examination testimony of Detective Hansen,
can this Court be certain, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury
4

would have convicted defendant anyway? Again, as this Court stated
in Dahlquist, the likelihood of conviction is irrelevant--it must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that conviction would have been the
result.
Secondly, if defendant had been allowed the opportunity to
cross-examine Detective Hansen concerning the statement defendant
made to him on April 14, 1994, there may have been exculpatory
evidence forthcoming.

Detective Hansen knew the defendant was

scared to go to the Weber County Jail, and testimony established
that the codefendant resided at that jail at that time.

Had the

defendant been afforded the opportunity for effective crossexamination of the Detective, these things would likely have been
revealed more clearly for the jury, and very possibly would have
resulted in an acquittal or a conviction on a lesser charge.
While few of defendant's statements are found in the record,
no doubt reference was made to them on the record.

Counsel for

codefendant stated, concerning defendant's statements:
I figure we have 14 statements that this defendant has
made. The first one goes from I wasn't there, but I
think Brandon did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled
the trigger and pointed the gun at me and made me drag
the body. He pointed the gun at me and made me load it
again so we could pump more bullets into the body.
That's what the statements are.
That is clearly a
situation where we have a co-defendant pointing the
finger at Mr. Dahlquist and saying he did it, he made me
do it, and Mr. Dahlquist's only defense is that I was
not there {R. at 515 line 13 to 516 line 8) (Emphasis
added).
•

*

*

. . . It is clear Mr. Telford is saying you made me do
it and you pointed a gun at me.
That's what Mr.
Telford's defense will be (R. at 517 line 12-15).
5

Clearly, defendant had made statements that led to counsel's
statements above.

Incidentally, counsel for the codefendant was

never challenged on these factual statements he made.

The State

would have this Court examine the April 14 statement in isolation
for

any

exculpatory

elements.

Proper

cross-examination

of

Detective Hansen may well have revealed that defendant made such
statements to him.
The redaction of the statement and restriction on cross
examination prohibited defendant from not only getting in the
remainder of the statement, which explicitly states that defendant
did not kill the victim, but also the cross-examination of
Detective Hansen might have revealed that defendant had said other
things which Detective Hansen did not write down, but into which
defendant was not allowed to inquire. The detective did admit that
there could be errors in his report.
defendant

in

a

position

where,

in

This, in effect, put the
order

to

explain

the

discrepancies, he would have to take the stand and subject himself
to cross-examination, something which he had a right not to do.
The trial court's rulings violated the defendant's right to due
process and a fair trial.
III. THE EVIDENCE DOESN'T SUPPORT THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONS.
The State argues that there is ample evidence that defendant
intentionally aided the codefendant in committing the murder, and
is therefore guilty as an accomplice.

£

Both defendants picked up the victim and drove him to the
murder scene.
This would show intention to aid in murder only if the
"accomplice" knows at that time that in fact a murder is going to
take place. The evidence only showed that defendant was merely a
passenger in the vehicle.
The defendant stood by as codefendant fired a clip of bullets
into the victim.
The defendant went to the truck and got more ammunition
instead of escaping or leaving to summon help.
What was the defendant supposed to do?

There is no evidence

he had a gun of his own, the nearest home was a mile and a half
away (R. at 1072 line
key to the vehicle.

19-23), and there is no evidence he had a
Also, the codefendant had been experiencing

problems with his vehicle earlier (R. at 1448 line 4 to 1449 line
5; 1450 line 14 to 1451 line 12), and there was no guarantee, even
if defendant had access to the key, that he could have gotten away
safely.
Moreover, the codefendant had the gun.

Though the gun had

jammed, defendant was not in a position to know whether the gun
could or would come "unjammed," and if it did come "unjammed"
during an attempt to flee, defendant may have found himself in the
same condition as the victim. Also, the defendant was very scared,
the shooting happened very quickly, and the defendant would not
have been thinking as clearly (or had the opportunity to) as those
who later argue and analyze the case.

7

Shells matching those at the murder scene were found in
defendant's vehicle.
The trial testimony established that the rounds found at the
scene and on the victim's body were copper coated
dipped) .

(R. at 1053 line 16 to 1054 line 21) .

{or copper
The medical

examiner testified that the bullets extracted from the victim's
body were copper coated.

(R. at 1572 line 17 to 1573 line 7) . The

bullets found in defendant's vehicle were lead end, not copper
coated.

(R. at 1066 line 13 to 1067 line 4) .

Testimony also

established that the type of ammunition found is very common and
can be found almost anywhere.

(R. at 1109 line 17-22) .

It is

noteworthy that the prosecuting attorney did not mention the
bullets found in defendant's vehicle during his closing argument-He knew there simply was no connection whatsoever between bullets
found in the defendant's vehicle and those used to kill the victim.
The defendant provided ammunition to the codefendant.
The defendant dragged the victim's body to the ditch.
Defendant was obviously scared.

(I bet I still have skid

marks in my pants that I was wearing." R. at 1764; State's Exhibit
37A) The fact that defendant retrieved a clip of ammunition for the
codefendant or that he moved the body no more evidences an intent
to help than it does the defendant's fear. Again, while there are
no direct statements by defendant in the record of participating
at gunpoint, there is evidence indicating he made such statements.
(See statements by codefendant's counsel on page 5 herein).
The defendant destroyed the gun.
The defendant did not state that he destroyed the gun; he said
8

that he would "take the rap for [it].11

(R. at 1763 line 12-13)

Even if we interpret this statement to mean that he actually
destroyed the gun, other evidence indicates a continuing fear of
the codef endant, as well as justification for such fear (Defendant
was scared to go to the same jail codefendant was being held in;
codefendant threatened defendant from prison).
Defendant's subsequent statements show his consciousness of
guilt.
The defendant's subsequent statements merely show that he
wanted to tell people about what happened, but was scared to. The
State would have this Court believe that defendant wrote a complete
and exhaustive book about what happened, including every minute
detail, every thought that went through his mind at every stage.
That didn't happen. Most defendant's (including this one) are not
English majors, nor are they great orators--they say and write
stupid things.

This is why defense attorneys frequently advise

their clients not to make any statements at all.
Why would the defendant initially lie about being at the
murder scene?
This is not a very good question.

If the defendant had been

threatened to not talk, then why would he initially admit that he
was at the murder scene? He wouldn't. Why did he eventually admit
it?

The codefendant had been arrested and was in jail.

The

defendant could easily have thought it was safe to talk at that
point, though the codefendant's subsequent threat showed that it
was not safe to talk.

9

Why wouldn't the defendant say that he had been under duress
to police?
It would appear that he did, as evidenced by the following:
I figure we have 14 statements that this defendant has
made. The first one goes from I wasn't there, but I
think Brandon did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled
the trigger and pointed the gun at me and made me drag
the body. He pointed the gun at me and made me load it
again so we could pump more bullets into the body.
That's what the statements are.
That is clearly a
situation where we have a co-defendant pointing the
finger at Mr. Dahlquist and saying he did it, he made me
do it, and Mr. Dahlquist's only defense is that I was
not there (R. at 515 line 13 to 516 line 8)
•

*

*

. . . It is clear Mr. Telford is saying you made me do
it and you pointed a gun at me.
That's what Mr.
Telford's defense will be (R. at 517 line 12-15).
If he were innocent, why would the defendant contemplate death
rather than face the charges?
Again, not a very good question.
who had been using drugs.
knows.

The defendant is a person

Why would a person use drugs?

We can only speculate.

Who

Moreover, the State is probably

taking the statement more literally than was intended. The state's
attempt at psychoanalysis is laudable, but naive.
The State argues that defendant's participation in the murder
didn't begin at the end, that it began with the motive he shared
to do something to the victim because he was selling diluted drugs.
(State's Br. ata 28).

There was no evidence, however, even

remotely alluded to by the prosecuting attorney, that the victim
had sold drugs (diluted or otherwise) during the time between the
beating and his death.

(It is important to remember that the

111

beating occurred because the victim had been selling diluted
drugs).
There was no evidence to support the argument that the motive
for murder was the victim selling diluted drugs, or that it was a
shared motive. The only motive supported by any evidence was the
phone call to the codefendant, and there was no evidence that that
had anything to do with the defendant: there was no evidence that
he was present during the phone call, there was no evidence the
codefendant told him about the phone call, and the substance of the
call related solely to the codefendant (setting up a deal to get
him busted) , not to the defendant. The prosecutor may have argued
the shared motive, but there was no evidence to support it.
Defendant's actions to go back to the truck and get more
bullets do not reveal a shared intent to kill.

There was no

evidence that defendant had a gun himself, and if he was in fact
ordered to do so, as inferred by the statements of codefendantfs
counsel, then defendant's actions show not an intent to kill, but
an intent to save himself from someone who had just proven that he
was very willing and capable of following through with his threats.
The jury made its decision based on the evidence presented
before it.

However, what decision would it have made if the

evidence had been presented differently? The State is required to
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the decision would be the
same, and that simply can't be done.
The Utah Supreme Court has found that when a trial court's
error

amounts

to

a

violation
11

of

a

defendant's

right

of

confrontation, reversal is required unless the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah
1995) . This court stated in State v. Dahlquist that " [f]or federal
constitutional error to be held harmless, we must ""sincerely
believe that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Dahlquist
at 37. There was a reasonable likelihood that, had the trials been
held separately, defendant Telford would have been acquitted of the
charge.

The error in this case was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS ON NOTICE THAT THE DEFENDANTS1 DEFENSES
WERE ANTAGONISTIC.
The State complains that "the arguments from trial that

defendant cites in his brief are codefendant's arguments about how
he could be prejudiced from a joint trial with defendant, not the
other way around."

(See State Br. at 26). First, the arguments

cited to were not from the trial, but from a hearing held on
September 19, 1994.

{See Appellant Br. at 24-25).

The intent

behind including those arguments was to show that the trial court
was in fact on notice that there was a problem with trying the
cases together.

It is true that counsel for defendant did not

argue for severance at that time, nor did he argue prejudice to
defendant.

However, it is important to bear in mind that as of

that time there had been no mention whatsoever that defendant's
statements would be redacted and that he wouldn't be allowed to
properly cross-examine the witnesses testifying as to them. Those
rulings didn't occur until the time of trial (the ruling to redact
the statement was given on March 28, 1995, approximately one week
12

before trial (R. at 546 line 11-15)) . The arguments were included
in defendant's brief merely to counter any notion that the trial
court

was

not

defendants1

apprised

of

the

antagonistic

nature

of

the

defenses, and of the problems of trying the two

defendants together.
V.

DEFENDANT DIDN'T TESTIFY BECAUSE HE HAD A RIGHT NOT TO
INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, YET ALSO HAD A RIGHT TO RELY ON
STATEMENTS HE'D GIVEN AND PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE
OFFICERS.
The State has argued that defendant's right against self-

incrimination was not violated because he in fact did not testify
at trial. This argument entirely misses the point. Defendant had
a right to present testimony through statements he'd given the
police.

Defendant also had a right to properly cross-examine any

officers who testified regarding his statements.

The defendant

also had a due process right not to have the jury misled by
incomplete statements.
If defendant had testified, he would then have subjected
himself to cross-examination, something he had a right not to do.
It was and is the defendant's position that by not testifying, he
preserves the issue for appeal of having been prejudiced by having
a joint trial, having his statement redacted, and being restricted
on

cross-examination

statement.

of

the

officer

regarding

defendant's

In short, in a separate trial the defendant would not

have been fettered by the competing constitutional rights of the
codefendant.

He would also have been unfettered by the competing

and antagonistic defense of the codefendant.

The jury would not

have been forced to choose between two versions of an event. The
13.

defendant, in a separate trial, could have presented his defense
to the jury and have it make a decision based on all the evidence,
not incomplete statements and lies presented as truth.
Conclusion
The court erred by refusing to sever the trials of the
defendants.

Their defenses were irreconcilably antagonistic and

it was prejudicial to try the defendants jointly. The trial court
also erred by admitting the redacted statement testified to by
Detective Hansen, and by limiting cross-examination concerning the
statement.

This Court should reverse the conviction and remand

this case for a new trial, separate from the codefendant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS / $

day of March 1997.
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